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Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk 
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis 
Patrick Butler* 
Abstract 
Every mile traveled by a car transfers risk to its insurer. This paper posits that 
the product of a cents-per-mile rate based on class experience and the miles recorded on 
the car's odometer appropriately earns prepaid premium while the car is driven. 
Operation of a practical car-mile system is described briefly. To test the competing 
idea that driver-record pricing responds to known large differences in risk transfer, a 
model used to validate claim free discounts is reexamined with the car-mile as the 
measure of individ ual cost. Driver-record pricing is found to inflate car-year price-to-
cost differences. Consequences of accident rate variability for a car-mile system are 
reviewed. The per mile cost of individual risk transfer is a class property because of 
the random nature of accidents. Driver-record pricing attempted on a per mile basis 
would amplify differences within classes. 
Key words and phrases: Per mile insurance, accident rate, risk classification, driver record 
model, merit rating 
1 Introduction 
Cost-based pricing of individual risk is a key ratemaking princi-
ple promulgated by the Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS). The prin-
ciple states that "A rate provides for the costs associated with an 
individual risk transfer;" see CAS (1993). The question for automo-
bile insurance is how the cost of individual driving risk should be 
measured. When a car is not being driven, its owner has no risk to 
transfer for driving coverage (for all losses as a direct consequence of 
the car's being driven) so the cost to its insurer is zero. Every mile a 
car is driven adds to its risk of accident; the total cost of risk transfer 
increases mile by mile. Both conditions point to adoption of the car-
mile (as opposed to the car-year that currently is used) as the unit of 
* Patrick Butler holds a Ph.D. in geochemistry from Harvard University. The author 
is currently director of the National Organization for Women's insurance project and 
formerly was a National Aeronautics and Space Administration research scientist, 
principal investigator, and the Curator of Lunar Samples. He has published papers on 
geochemistry, lunar science, and automobile insurance pricing. 
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risk transfer, that is, the exposure unit. Conversion of class rates from 
dollars per car-year to cents per car-mile for driving coverages would 
be required by a one sentence amendment to rate regulatory law pro-
posed in several states. 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the car-mile 
exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of individual risk 
transfer. The effect of driver-record pricing on individuals is ana-
lyzed with the car-mile unit as the objective measure of cost. 
2 Car-Mile Exposure Unit 
The entire entry on the exposure unit in the CAS statement of 
ratemaking principles is: "The determination of an appropriate unit 
or premium basis is essential. It is desirable that the exposure unit 
vary with the hazard and be practical and verifiable." The cur-
rently accepted assessment of the car-mile exposure unit for automo-
bile insurance seems to have been established by Dorweiler (1929). 
Regarding the variation-with-hazard requirement, Dorweiler states: 
"The mileage exposure medium is superior to the car-year medium in 
yielding an exposure that varies with the hazard, as it responds 
more to the actual usage of the car." Note that Dorweiler's phrase 
"responds more" obscures the fact that the car-year does not respond 
to actual use of the car. In addition, suspension of coverage during 
periods of no use requires administrative intervention. Dorweiler fur-
ther states that "[t]he devices and records necessary for the introduc-
tion of [the car-mile] medium make it impractical under present 
conditions," and that while the car-year "measures the exposure 
prospectively, the [car-mile] require[s] a final adjustment which 
would be determined retrospectively." 
Despite Dorweiler's assessment of superiority of the car-mile 
exposure unit over the car-year unit in a fundamental characteristic 
and his qualified judgment concerning its practicality, no substantive 
actuarial reassessment has been published. Bouska (1989) updates 
Dorweiler's paper and notes without comment that conversion to the 
car-mile unit has been advocated by the National Organization for 
Women. In a discussion of Bouska's paper, Diamantoukos (1991) 
observes only that the car-mile exposure unit is "perhrps a theoreti-
cally superior one in some respects" to the car-year unit. 
The National Organization for Women completed a 1992 study1 
for Pennsylvania legislators on operation of a car-mile system which 
1 National Organization for Women. Operation of an Alldited-Mile/Year Automobile 
Insurance System Under Pennsylvania Law. Washington, DC: NOW, 1992, reprinted in 
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suggests that such a system would follow the odometer-limit and non-
tampering conditions used in mechanical breakdown insurance poli-
cies, but otherwise would not differ much from current practice. The 
study follows transactions involving an example car, including a 
midyear sale, for four policy years. Premium payment in advance 
would be required to keep insurance protection in force. The premium 
for driving coverage at car-mile rates is prepaid in mile amounts and 
at times chosen by the car owner. Administrative expense and a pre-
mium for nondriving coverages are based on yearly rates and are pre-
paid at each policy-year renewal. Premium would be earned by the 
car's insurer by the day for non driving coverages, as is currently done 
for all coverages, and by the mile recorded on the odometer for driv-
ing coverages. The car's insurance ID card displays the odometer-mile 
and date limits at which protection lapses pending further premium 
prepayment. 
Policy renewal under this plan would be conditional on taking 
the car to a garage designated by the company for an annual odome-
ter audit. The odometer would be inspected and read, and tamper-
evident seals would be applied at the initial audit. Theft of insur-
ance protection is controlled because tampering with the odometer-
already a federal crime-automatically voids the policy. Driving 
with the cable unhooked does not steal insurance protection, because 
tampering usually would be detected after an accident, and tampering 
voids protection. The cents per car-mile rate would depend on cover-
age and the car's classification as appropriate by territory, use, 
driver, and other categories. 
3 Driver-Record Pricing 
Advertisements such as those promIsmg "good rates for good 
drivers" lead consumers to believe that accidents can be avoided and 
that the important condition in individual risk of accident is how a 
car is driven, not how it much it is driven. This belief is encouraged 
through the use of merit ratings by automobile insurers to raise or 
lower individual prices at policy renewal time. 
The actuarial literature has neglected to examine the effect of 
driver-record pricing on individual price-to-cost ratios where the 
claim rate average for the class is taken as the price and defined 
individual claim rates are taken as the costs of hypothetical indi-
viduals composing the class. Recent studies of driver records have 
The Casualty Actuarial Society Forum (Summer 1993): 307-338. This study is available 
from NOW, 1000 16th Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036. 
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focused on general questions of variation in individual risk without 
reference to pricing or cost. For example, Mahler (1991) examines the 
state accident records of drivers for variation in individual risk over 
time (14 years), but does not discuss how the information could be 
applied to pricing automobile risk transfer. An earlier actuarial 
study done for insurance regulators, however, provides information on 
individual price-to-cost effects. 
A widely circulated 1979 report on risk classification by insurance 
company actuaries on the industry Advisory Committee to the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners contains a section on 
driver-record pricing. The report describes the issue of pricing indi-
vidual risk transfer: "Many accidents are the result of chance. The 
problem becomes-how can insurers identify the 'bad' drivers from 
the 'good' drivers who were unlucky?" The impossibility of solving 
this problem through driver records, although downplayed in the 
report, is illustrated with a compound Poisson model composed of 
specified numbers of drivers defined to have uniform high and low 
annual rates of accident involvement. 
In a subsequent study of driver-record pricing, Butler and Butler 
(1989) analyze the high and low accident rate model in terms of the 
car-mile exposure unit. They value the price-to-cost ratio for individ-
ual cars in terms of cents per mile and conclude that pricing based on 
accident, claim, or traffic violation records greatly increases the 
existing overpricing for unlucky owners of cars driven less than the 
annual average for their risk class. 
Continuing justification for driver-record pricing, however, relies 
on the fact that cars whose drivers have had recent accidents (or 
traffic convictions) average more accidents in a subsequent year than 
do cars identically classified whose drivers have not had a recent 
accident. A simplified explanation for this fact-in terms of a uni-
form claim rate per mile-is presented below through reinterpreta':.. 
tion of a classic model for a claim free discount plan. Assumption of a 
cents-per-mile cost for all cars of the model provides a base for ana-
lyzing the price-to-cost effects of driver-record pricing on individual 
cars. This article also considers the variation in claim rates per mile 
and its consequences for classification and driver-record pricing under 
a car-mile system in place of the assumed uniform claim rate per 
mile. 
4 Bailey & Simon Model for Claim-Record Experience 
The CAS paper "An Actuarial Note on the Credibility of 
Experience of a Single Private Passenger Car," by Bailey and Simon 
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(1959) is the chief reference on the CAS examination syllabus which 
shows and models the application of driver-record pricing to insur-
ance for individual cars. Familiarity with its method of calculating 
Poisson models is required for questions on the CAS exam on advanced 
ratemaking; see Murdza (1992). 
Bailey and Simon examine the Canadian liability claims experi-
ence of about 4 million insured car-years. The claim rate of the undi-
vided class for each of five classes defined by car use and driver type 
is compared with the rates calculated for four subclasses created by 
sorting the records according to how many full years have elapsed 
since the last claim was incurred by the car's drivers. 
The relative effects of sorting cars by the prior claim records of 
their drivers are similar for all five classes and are not affected sig-
nificantly by a correction for territorial class differences. The experi-
ence for the largest Canadian class, Class 1, is shown in Table 1. The 
recalculated rate relative to the claim rate for the undivided class 
was 9 percent lower for the three year claim free subclass and 
progressively higher with decreasing time since the last prior claim. 
TABLE 1 
1957-1959 Canadian Automobile Claim Data by Prior Claim Records· 
Class 1 
Pleasure-No Male Operator Under 25 
Number of 
Claims Incurred 
Car-Years 
Insured 
Claims Per 
Car-Year 
Class 
(undivided) 
288,019 
3,325,714 
0.087 
3+ 
217,151 
2,757,520 
0.079 
Years Since Last Prior Claim 
2 1 
13,792 19,346 
130,706 163,544 
0.105 0.118 
* Source: Bailey and Simon (1959); claim rate calculated 
o 
37,730 
273,944 
0.138 
As part of their examination of the statistical justification for 
claim free discounts, Bailey and Simon structure a model that repro-
duces the decrease in the claim rate observed in the Canadian data. 
The model comprises cars with three annual amounts of risk transfer 
representing a fourfold range in annual claim rates: 100,000 cars with 
a uniform risk transfer rate of 0.05 claims per car-year (Amount I); 
100,000 cars with a uniform rate of 0.10 claims per car-year (Amount 
II); and 50,000 cars with a uniform rate of 0.20 claims per car-year 
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(Amount III). The average claim rate of the model class is 0.10 
claims per car-year. Bailey and Simon calculate the number of cars 
that would be claim free with a Poisson distribution after three 
years and combine them into a claim free subclass for each of the 
defined risk transfer rates. They calculate that the average claim 
rate for the new mix of the three defined rates would be 8 percent 
less than the class average. A subclass reduction in claim rates 
requires an offsetting claim-rate increase, however, to maintain the 
overall class average. 
Because the present study concerns how all cars are affected indi-
vidually by the pricing of risk transfer, the Bailey and Simon model 
calculations are extended here to include the subclasses with more 
recent prior claims. The results are compared with the Canadian 
experience in Figure 1. (Table 2 shows the calculated distribution of 
cars with the three defined risk transfer rates among the four claim-
record subclasses.) 
The extended model reproduces the general features of the 
Canadian claim data. (Bailey and Simon point out that further 
adjustment of model parameters would achieve more detailed agree-
ment of the model with the Canadian data. For the present purposes, 
however, such adjustment would add to complexity but not to under-
standing.) If claim rates are taken as a measure of relative insurance 
prices: 
• The price level for the claim free majority: of cars decreases 
below the rate that the undivided class would pay; and 
• This relatively small decrease is balanced by sharp price 
increases for the minority subclasses with recent claims. 
The Bailey and Simon model, by reproducing empirical claim 
record insurance experience, shows the large variation in individual 
risk transfer that exists within automobile insurance price classes. 
Individuals in the same class are charged different prices for the 
same amount of risk transfer. The Amount I cars (0.05 claims per car-
year) are charged four pure premiums and Amount II cars (0.10 claims 
per car-year) are charged two pure premiums for the same amount of 
risk transfer that costs the Amount III cars (0.20 claims per car-year) 
only one year's pure premium. 
5 Risk Transfer and Miles Driven 
Bailey and Simon (1960) consider reasons for the large variation 
in annual risk transfer within single price classes as indicated by the 
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Figure 1-Claim Rates of Prior-Claim Subclasses 
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Canadian claim record experience and posited in the Bailey and 
Simon 1959 model for the experience. They note that driver-record 
and class plans are "quite ineffective in separating the better risks 
from the poorer risks," and conclude that: 
[W]e have reached the point where we may state that the still 
unanalyzed cause (or causes) of variation among individual risks: 
(1) has a wide dispersion, (2) varies significantly from year to 
year for an individual risk, and (3) is measured only to a limited 
extent by the class plan and the merit rating plan. Annual 
mileage, which has long been felt to be an important measure of 
hazara, fits all these requirements better than any other single 
cause. 
The first characteristic-dispersion of cars by annual miles 
driven-is corroborated by the U. S. Department of Transportation's 
nationwide personal transportation surveys. In 1977 one in five house-
hold cars was driven less than 3,000 miles, and one in ten was driven 
more than 20,000 miles; see Butler, Butler, and Williams (1988, p. 
376). 
The second characteristic-significant individual year-to-year 
variation in miles driven-is one that can be measured only by the 
car's odometer. Nevertheless, Bailey and Simon do not note a need 
for the car-mile exposure measure, but seem to view mileage as a 
lump sum class definition from which experienced car-year cost aver-
ages are used prospectively to set base price multipliers. 
The third characteristic implies that variation in risk transfer 
amounts among individual cars resulting from differences in miles 
driven can be measured by class and driver-record plans. Modern class 
plans continue to show narrow distributions of cars by base price mul-
tiplier, in contrast to the range in miles driven; see Butler, Butler, 
and Williams (1988). 
6 Bailey & Simon Model With Uniform Claim Rate Per Mile 
Within-class variation in individual amounts of risk transfer per 
year can be seen as variation in the product of a rate variable and an 
exposure variable for each car; that is, variation in the product of a 
hypothetical average claim rate per mile for a car over the course of 
a year and the number of miles the car is driven. The current practice 
of charging annual rates for risk transfer implicitly assumes that the 
two variables cannot be resolved. In a car-mile system, however, the 
value of the exposure variable is recorded by each car's odometer. 
The following analysis of the Bailey and Simon model assumes that 
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all of the model cars share the same average risk-transfer rate, 
0.00001 claims per mile. (The effect of presumed within-class differ-
ences in individual average claim rates per mile is considered later.) 
The model differences in annual risk transfer amount, therefore, are 
measured by the exposure variable. 
The adopted claim rate per mile defines the miles per year 
driven for the model's three risk amounts. For Amount I cars, 0.05 
claims per year means 5,000 miles exposure per year; for Amount II 
cars, 0.10 claims per year means 10,000 miles exposure per year; and 
for Amount III cars, 0.20 claims per year means 20,000 miles exposure 
per year. The total risk transferred at the end of 20,000 miles 
traveled is the same for all cars. 
TABLE 2 
Model Distribution of Mile-Amount Cars by Claim-Record Subclass 
Amount Years Since Last Claim 
of Risk MileslYear Class 
Transfer (Each Car) (Undivided) 3+' 2 0 
Number of Cars 
I 5,000 100,000 86,071 4,413 4,639 4,877 
II 10,000 100,000 74,082 7,791 8,611 9,516 
III 20,000 50,000 27,441 6,075 7,421 9,063 
Total cars 250,000 187,594 18,279 20,671 23,456 
Avg. Miles per Car-Year 10,000 9,169 12,118 12,468 12,824 
Avg. Claims per Car-Year at 0.1000 0.0917 0.1218 0.1247 0.1282 
0.00001 Claims per Car-Mile 
, Number of cars in subclass from Bailey and Simon (1959) 
Bailey and Simon use their model to examine the mix of risks in 
the claim free subclass. The present study extends the analysis to 
obtain distributions of cars transferring the three risk amounts in the 
other three claim-record subclasses, as shown in Table 2. (As only the 
most recent claim is recognized by the plan, the claim-record distribu-
tion of the cars is calculated working back in time with a declining 
balance of claim free cars eligible to have a claim that counts. For 
example, of the 100,000 Amount I cars eligible in the 0 year, 4,877 
have claims by the Poisson distribution at a 0.05 rate. The claim free 
balance of 95,123 cars similarly is reduced in past year 1 and so on for 
three years.) The miles-per-car-year average for each subclass is 
determined by the mix of Amount I, II, and III cars. 
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Although the number of cars transferring each risk amount (I, II, 
and III) increases with claim recency (from 2 to 1 to 0 years since the 
last claim), the number of highest mile cars (20,000 miles) increases 
most rapidly. Therefore, the average miles driven is highest (12,824 
miles) in the most recent claim subclass (0 years). The average of the 
claim free subclass (3+ years) concurrently decreases from the class 
average of 10,000 miles to 9,169 miles. 
7 Accidents as Random Sampling 
If it is assumed that each class has uniform average claim rates 
per mile, automobile accidents in the Bailey and Simon model can be 
envisioned as a random sampling of the class population on the road. 
Accidents can sample only what is exposed. (Bias in the accident 
sampling of real car-mile class populations that results from differ-
ences in the average driving conditions encountered by individual cars 
is examined later in the paper.) Cars driven many miles and cars 
driven few miles are included in the random accident sample of the 
car-miles driven by the cars in the class. Because cars driven more 
than the class average put more miles on the road, they are overrep-
resented in the accident sample. Cars driven less than average are 
underrepresented in this sample relative to their proportion in the 
class. The average miles per car of the recent claim subclasses are 
increased through this random sampling process. The preferential 
selection of cars driven more miles into the recent claim subclasses 
also concurrently lowers (slightly) the average miles per car of the 
large remaining population of cars without accidents. Because of 
their greater average number of miles of exposure, therefore, the 
recent claim subclasses average more claims in a subsequent year than 
does the claim free subclass. All of the recent claim subclasses, how-
ever, also contain cars driven less than the class average. 
8 Price-to-Cost Accuracy for Individual Risk Transfer 
The miles-driven interpretation of the Bailey and Simon model 
provides a cost measure in car-miles for the three individual amounts 
of risk transferred. A price-to-cost relationship can be established for 
the three risk transfer amounts (I, II, and III) in the undivided class 
and in each of the four driver-record subclasses, a total of 15 relation-
ships applied to the 15 groupings of cars in Table 2. (An equivalent 
15 price-to-cost ratios would result from dividing the model's average 
claim rates per year at the five class and subclass prices by the three 
defined annual claim rates at the individual costs. Without being 
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referenced to an objective standard such as odometer miles for measur-
ing individual cost, however, the ratios would be without practical 
significance. ) 
To picture the price-to-cost transfer comparisons, assume a class-
average cost of $10,000 per claim. This claim cost (severity) multi-
plied by the assumed model rate of 0.00001 claims per mile produces 
a cost of 10 cents per mile pure premium for the class. Because the 
average amount driven per year for the class is 10,000 miles, the 10 
cents-per-mile cost makes the class cost (pure premium) $1,000 per car-
year. 
Despite the range in miles driven, it is assumed that all of the 
cars stay in the same dollars-per-year class (as the Bailey and Simon 
model implicitly assumes). This would have been the case for the 
Canadian experience under the class plans of the time and is true now 
for a large number of cars. Current discounts for estimated future 
mileage less than 7,500 or 8,000 miles in some company class plans 
are not used or have been discontinued by other automobile insurers as 
intrinsically lacking in objectivity. (Because the discount difference 
between 5,000 and 20,000 estimated future miles is usually about 15 
percent, the adjustment would not affect the results of the analysis 
Significantly.) 
Without claim-record pricing, all individuals pay the $1,000 per 
year pure premium for the class, the same premium that Amount II 
cars would pay at 10 cents a mile. At a $1,000 annual rate, however, 
the 20,000 mile Amount III cars pay 5 cents a mile, while the 5,000 
mile Amount I cars pay 20 cents a mile, as shown by Figure 2. 
When the model class is subdivided on the basis of claim records, 
the proportions of cars at the three mile amounts are changed in the 
four subclasses created. These new mile averages multiplied by the 
assumed rate of 0.00001 claims per mile produce four new pure premi-
ums for the claim-record subclasses: $917 for the claim free subclass 
and $1,212, $1,247, and $1,282 for the progressively more recent 
claims subclasses. These four annual premiums divided by the three 
mile amounts in each subclass produce the 12 new prices per mile for 
the model cars shown in Figure 2. The effects on the cars at the three 
mile amounts are different. 
The effect of claim-record pricing on the risk transfer Amount II 
cars, which are individually driven 10,000 miles per year, is most 
telling. Without subclassification, all Amount II cars pay 10 cents a 
mile for insurance. With subclassification, most of them receive a 1 
cent reduction in the cost per mile. Some cars in the class which have 
had a recent claim, however, pay 2 cents to 3 cents more per mile 
(Figure 2). Claim-record subclassification transforms pricing that is 
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cost-based by definition for all Amount II individual cars to pricing 
that is not accurate for any cars. 
It could be argued that improved price-to-cost accuracy is needed 
most for the model car risk transfer amounts that differ most from 
the class average. Without claim-record subclassification, the cars at 
the 5,000 mile amount pay 20 cents a mile, 10 cents a mile more than 
the class average price. In the claim free subclass such cars receive a 
2 cent per mile reduction in price. This reduction, however, is much 
smaller than the 4 cents to 5 cents a mile below the class average 
price that the cars at Amount III (20,000 miles) pay regardless of 
their claim-record subclass. Furthermore, provision of this 2-cents-per-
mile downward adjustment for the cars at Amount I is gained at great 
cost to the Amount I cars with recent claims. For these individuals, 
the 20-cent-a-mile amount they pay without claim-recency pricing is 
increased 4 cents to 6 cents a mile in the recent claims subclasses. This 
increase equals the entire per mile price paid by the cars at Amount 
III regardless of their claim-record subclass. The only negative effect 
for Amount III cars of pricing on claim record is that some lose a 
small part of their per mile subsidy (Figure 2). 
Statistically, a decrease in the average cost per mile paid by 
Amount I cars from 20 cents to 19.3 cents coupled with an increase in 
the average cost per mile paid by Amount III cars from 5 cents to 5.3 
cents is evidenced in a 6 percent decrease in variance of price-to-cost 
ratios from the three ratios of the undivided class to the twelve 
ratios of the driver-record subclasses. The reduced variance, however, 
should not mask the disparate cost of the improved statistics on 
individuals that is evident in Figure 2. Driver-record pricing 
increases the range in price-to-cost ratios paid by individuals in the 
same class 40 percent, from a spread of 15 cents a mile before driver-
record pricing to 21 cents a mile between the lowest value for Amount 
III cars and the highest for Amount I cars. Operating at random on 
individuals, the so-called improvement increases the underpricing of 
risk transfer for some cars already underpriced and the overpricing of 
risk transfer for some cars already overpriced. 
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Figure 2 
Effect of Model Annual Premiums on Car-Mile Prices 
Class Premium $1000/Car-Year 
30¢ . - -. - -- _. - -_ .. - -- _. - -- - -- _. - -- _. - -- _. ---
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O¢ 
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Miles Driven by Each Car 
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If the pricing unit were converted from car-year to car-mile so 
that all of the car-owners in the model class paid the same 10 cents 
per mile rate, however, each owner would pay only for the on-the-
road protection the car consumed, while total premium received by 
insurers would remain the same. A car driven the model class aver-
age of 10,000 miles would experience no change in the $1,000 premium 
with insurance charged at car-mile rates, provided its mile amount 
did not change. A car driven 4,780 miles would pay $478, while a car 
driven 21,240 miles would pay $2,124. 
9 Variation In Claim Rates Per Mile 
The large differences in the type of risk environment that cars 
can encounter are indicated by comparing statistics for accident sever-
ities and per mile accident rates between interstate highways and 
city streets or between day and night driving on the same road. For 
example, the injury rates per million vehicle-miles of travel ranged 
from 0.36 on rural interstates to 3.0 on local urban roads in 1991; see 
Federal Highway Administration (1992). In principle, therefore, the 
diverse individual mixtures of car use and driving environment make 
it inevitable that changes in class definition would result in different 
claim costs per mile for new classes. 
Accident rates per vehicle mile depend not only on traffic engi-
neering classification of accidents experienced under roadway or other 
relevant conditions during some time period, but also on determina-
tion of the number of vehicle-miles of exposure to risk that produced 
the classified accidents. The same relationship holds for automobile 
insurance. Only if car-miles of exposure are determined can the num-
ber and cost of claims incurred within a certain time period by a cer-
tain class of cars provide any quantitative information on the 
expected risk transfer cost of each mile that cars in the class will 
travel in a subsequent rating period. 
As an example of the effect of classifiable per mile differences 
within a business-use class of cars with adult drivers, assume two 
types of car use by sales representatives. With reference to the gov-
ernment injury rates given above, assume that one type of use covers 
the whole state and averages 0.25 claims per million car-miles 
(statewide cars), while the other covers only a metropolitan area 
and averages one claim per million car-miles (metro cars). Any lower 
average cost per claim by the metro cars resulting from lower speed 
urban accidents would narrow the effect on the claim cost per mile of 
the 4:1 claim-rate difference. Separately classifying the statewide 
and metro cars, provided there were enough car-miles of each usage 
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type for statistical reliability, would show the differences in car-
mile cost. 
10 Accidents as Biased Random Sampling 
The analogy used above for viewing accidents as a process of sam-
pling car-miles on the road can be extended to presumed variations 
within classes in per mile accident rates. To the extent that cars are 
not classified by driver age and experience according to the known 
per mile differences in accident involvement for these categories, the 
accident random sampling of class car-mile populations would be 
biased toward the cars driven by inexperienced drivers and by 
drivers near the beginning and end of the driver age range. Further, 
owing to differences in driving conditions by time and place, the 
accident random sample of car-miles would be biased to the cars used 
more under conditions of higher risk per mile. The accident samples, 
however, also will contain cars used on average under conditions of 
lower risk per mile. For example, with a Poisson distribution of 
claims at the rates given for the hypothetical business use cars, 18 
percent of the metro cars will incur claims in 200,000 miles of driving, 
but so will 4.9 percent of the statewide cars. 
11 Driver-Record Pricing on a Car-Mile Basis 
Like the current driver-record pricing on a car-year basis, driver-
record pricing under a car-mile exposure unit system would have an 
apparent justification in cost. The inevitable bias in an accident sam-
ple assures that the subclass of cars defined as incurring a claim in 
the most-recent-miles-traveled interval-within the most recent 
50,000 miles, for example-will average more accidents per mile in a 
following miles-traveled interval than the class average. Applying a 
recent claim surcharge to the cents-per-mile class price, however, 
would constitute a deliberate, random, and unjustifiable increase in 
what is paid per mile by the recent claim cars with lower than 
average claim rates compared to what they would pay if they were 
classified separately. Furthermore, the higher per mile charges for 
the recent claim cars with significantly higher than average claim 
rates per mile still would be less than what they would pay if they 
were classified separately. 
Because both the claim free and recent claim subclasses of a class 
are mixtures of cars with above average and below average claim 
rates per mile, any action to separate them must be through class 
redefinition applied to the whole class. 
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12 Conclusion 
CAS introduces its ratemaking principles with the specification 
that "[rlatemaking is prospective because the property and casualty 
insurance rate must be developed prior to the transfer of risk." In a 
car-mile system, evaluation of the cost per mile to be used in a 
prospective class rate can be done only on the basis of claim experi-
ence for a group of cars referenced to the group's total measured car-
miles of exposure that produced the claims. 
What cannot be known prospectively, because it is controlled by 
individual car owners, is the amount of risk that will be transferred 
through operation of each car. Although risk transfer is paid in 
advance at a class rate per mile, protection is not consumed (premium 
is not earned by the insurer) until the risk is transferred, mile after 
mile, by driving. Conversely, premiums charged at car-year rates 
invert this cost-based relationship by charging less per mile for each 
mile of protection consumed, a contradiction of cost-based pricing. The 
assumption that this contradiction is unavoidable on practical 
grounds is not neutral. It favors all owners of cars driven more miles 
per year than the average for their class. 
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